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PROTECTION OF FAMOUS TRADEMARKS IN 
JAPAN AND THE UNITED SJ'ATES 
KENNETH L. PORT" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concepts of trademark jurisprudence in Japan and the United 
States differ drastically. I This difference is apparent in many aspects of 
trademark protection in both countries and is most evident in the treatment 
offamous marks. Although Japan and the United States share elements of 
trademark law that cause some observers to claim that Japan is legally the 
fifty-first State, the conceptual differences at the foundation of trademark 
law in each country are so significant that such a claim seems inaccurate and 
misleading. 
On the surface, Japanese and United States legal tenninologies seem 
to overlap. For example, in both countries "trademark" (shohyo) refers to 
the symbols corporations use on products to identify the source of their 
products. Because both countries define "trademark" similarly, many 
people expect trademark disputes to come to the same resolution in both 
countries given the same set of facts. When this does not occur, United 
States corporations are quick to claim that the Japanese do not trade fairly. 
Despite the commonality of words, the express objectives of the 
United States and Japanese trademark laws are not consistent. The 
statutorily expressed objectives of Japanese trademark jurisprudence are as 
follows: 
By protecting trademarks, this law aims to maintain trust in the 
businesses of trademark users and thereby to contribute to the 
growth/development of business and to protect the interests of the 
consumer.2 
·Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D. University of Wisconsin-
Madison 1989; B.A. Macalaster College 1982. The author greatly appreciates the input ofNobuhiro 
Nakayama, Yuriko Inoue, Keita Sato, and Hirofumi Ito in the preparation of this paper. The research 
for this paper was conducted at the University of Tokyo with the support of a Fulbright Research Grant. 
This paper was presented to faculty and students at the Institute for Comparative Law, Chuo University, 
Tokyo, Japan in June of 1995 and the Wisconsin International Law Symposium: "Issues Regarding 
Intellectual Property in South and East Asia," on March 1, 1997. 
IA more comprehensive treatment of some of the issues raised herein can be found in KENNETH 
L. PORT, JAPANESE TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE (1997). Portions of the material herein were first 
published as Kenneth L. Port, A Comparison between Japanese and United States Trademark Laws, 29 
CHUOCOMP. L. REv. 23 (1995). 
lShohyoho [Trademark Law], Law No. 127 of 1957, art. I. All translations of the Japanese 
Trademark Law herein were done by the author and can be found in the Appendix to PORT, JAPANESE 
TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE, supra note I. 
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In contrast, the United States trademark system has the following objectives: 
to protect the goodwill of the trademark owner, to protect the public from 
deception, and to protect third parties' rights to use trademarks.3 Unlike 
United States trademark law, Japanese trademark law does not aim to 
protect third parties' rights to use trademarks. The reference to the 
consumer in the Japanese statute above provides a means to protect the 
value of the mark and the business associated with the mark, and is not an 
end in itself as it is in the United States system.4 
Given the broad conceptual distinctions between the United States 
and Japanese notions of trademarks, it is not surprising that strikingly 
different trademark dispute resolutions may occur. Protection that is 
possible in the United States may be impossible in Japan. This does not 
mean that the Japanese are unfair, but rather that the Japanese have a 
disparate conception of the right involved. The fact that this right is 
conceived of differently does not render the Japanese perspective of the 
trademark illegitimate as some harsh critics contend. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
A. Definition of trademarks in Japan 
Japanese law defines trademarks as "letters, figures or symbols or 
three dimensional shapes or any combination thereof including in 
combination with colors ... used by a person in respect to the goods it 
manufactures, certifies or sells as part of its business or ... used by a person 
in respect to the services it offers or certifies as part of its business."s 
Service marks only recently became subject to trademark protection.6 
Three-dimensional marks (rittaishohyo) only became the valid subject of 
trademark protection when the Trademark Amendments of 1996 took effect 
on April 1, 1997. The delay in protecting three-dimensional marks in Japan 
resulted from a fear that protection of these marks could result in a 
monopoly-like status over common items that society may need to prosper 
and that businesses need to compete. 
, Kenneth L. Port, 'The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute 
Necessary? 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 477 (1994). 
'Bonio Boats,lnc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 157 (1989). 
'MAKOTO AMINO, SHOHYOHO [TRADEMARKS) 78-82 (1995). 
6See Shohyoho [Trademark Law), Law No. 65 of 1992. 
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B. Definition of trademarks in u.s. 
United States law defines trademarks as any word, symbol or device 
that indicates the source or origin of a good or service.7 The U.S. Supreme 
Court recently found the color green-gold used on press pads in the dry-
cleaning business to be protectable by trademark law.s The Court also 
found the decor inside a Mexican restaurant to be protectable by trademark 
law.9 These cases represent a grand expansion of trademark jurisprudence 
by the courts. In trademark decisions, courts in the United States continue 
to "make law" not just "interpret law." 
Currently, the Japanese definition of trademarks is more narrow 
than that of the U. S. As previously noted, April 1, 1997 was the first date 
that three-dimensional trademarks could be registered in Japan. Therefore, 
even the most fundamental beginning point - the objectives of the 
trademark system - and the definition of what is protectable differ greatly 
between the United States and Japan. The reasons for these differences are 
explored below. 
III. CONCEPTUAL ORlGINS 
A. Origins of Japanese trademark law 
In Japan, recognition of symbols having value to indicate origin 
dates from ancient times. For example, the Taiho Ritsuryo of A. D. 701 
included provisions covering marks.lo However, these provisions were 
intended only to regulate the overproduction of crudely manufactured 
goods. Therefore, the basic concepts of trademark protection expressed in 
the Taiho Ritsuryo may differ from what trademark protection means today. 
Nonetheless, in 701 in the Taiho Ritsuryo, specific recognition is given to 
the concept of trademarks. Even in the Muromachi Period (1392-1573), 
those that used trademarks surreptitiously were punished. I I 
One of the oldest, if not the oldest, cases in the world where a court 
or quasi-judicial body explicitly recognized the trademark right occurred in 
Japan in 1478. In what is known as the Rokuseimon case, the prior user of 
the mark "Rokuseimon" (or Rokusei crest) petitioned the Muromachi 
bakufu (quasi military government). The bakufu issued an injunction even 
715 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127 (1994). 
RQualitex Co. v. Jacobson Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
"Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
IOSHOEN ONO, SHOHYOHO GAISETSU [AN OUTLINE OF TRADEMARK LAW) 33 (1989). 
"/d. 
HeinOnline -- 15 Wis. Int’l L.J. 262 1996-1997
262 Wisconsin International Law Journal 
though no trademark statute existed at that time. 12 Therefore, the concept 
of marks indicating origin of goods and that these marks have value is not 
a new concept in Japan. 
Origins of current Japanese trademark protection lie with the 
passage of the first trademark law in June of 1884 (Meiji 17). Meiji 17 
represents the first modem, comprehensive and statutory prot~ction of 
Japanese trademarks. This statute established the registration-based 
system,13 which provided a shorter period of trademark duration than that 
which existed in common law jurisdictions at the time,14 and which 
contained the principle of the priority of first registration. IS This law also 
included the rule that non-use for any three-year period was grounds for 
canceling the exclusive rights in the trademark. 16 Although the trademark 
law has been amended numerous times subsequent to Meiji 17, these axioms 
remain constant. 
The trademark statute in effect in Japan today was enacted in 
1957.17 This law carries forward the rather rigid first-to-file system.s It 
has been amended many times, including the Amendments of 1996. 
However, none of these . amendments change the basic conceptual 
orientation of the manner in which trademarks rights are perceived or 
enforced. 
B. Origins of United States trademark law 
The origin of Unite<J States trademark law is rooted in the tort of 
deceit. Although trademarks have been used around the world for more 
than 3,500 years to designate the craftsperson or maker of an article, judicial 
acceptance in Common Law jurisdictions of the affirmative trademark right 
started sometime before 1618 in England. In Southern v. How, a cause of 
action was found against a clothes-maker when he copied the plaintiffs 
mark and placed it on his substandard goods. 19 However, a reference in 
Southern v. How to a prior, unreported and lost case suggests that judicial 
recognition of trademark rights may have existed before ~. 
From 1618, trademark law was viewed as a part of unfair 
competition law. Unfair competition law developed from the tort of fraud 
l2"fhis case is reported in the April 18, 1478 entry to the "Oyamoto Nikki" [Oyamoto Diary] which 
purports to chronicle concurrent events. Discussion of it can also be found in RAISUKE NUMATA, NIPPON 
MONSHOUGAKU [JAPANESE HERALDRY] 167 (1968). 
13Shohyo Jorei [rrademark Regulations of 1884], art. I. 
1'15 years rather than 20. Id. art. 1. 
ISId. art. 3. 
16Id. art. 13. 
17Shohyoho, supra note 2. 
18Id. art. 18. 
I'Southem v. How, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1618). 
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and deceit. English courts first used the tenn unfair competition in 1803 in 
conjunction with tenns like "passing off' or "palming off."20 . The 
justification of this tort was that one should not pass off one's goods as those 
of another and thereby profit from the deception. Some early cases even 
found that the trademark owner and would-be plaintiff lacked standing 
because it was the buying public, rather than the trademark owner, that was 
deceived and therefore damaged. Thus, these courts found that the correct 
plaintiff was the deceived public, not the trademark owner. 
Some commentators in the United States assert th.at a trademark is 
property, and therefore, trademark owners can sue in trespass for 
unauthorized use.21 However, these people are either mistaken or pursuing 
a separate agenda. The confusion about whether trademark sounds in tort 
or in trespass stems from the old English rule in equity that an injunction 
could not issue unless a property right was at stake. However, in 1838, an 
English court in Millington v. For2 granted an injunction for the firsttime 
in equity for trademark infringement. In that case, proof of the defendant's 
intent to defraud and the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiffs rights in 
and to the mark were not necessary for the plaintiff to prevail. 
Based on this case, some have come to the erroneous conclusion 
that a trademark is subject to property ownership and that infringement 
constitutes a trespass and not a tort. The logic behind this conclusion is that 
the court could not have issued the injunction in Millington v. Fox unless the 
court was also concluding that the trademark itself was property. 
U. S. courts have rejected this line of reasoning numerous times. 
Most recently, the U. S. Supreme Court stated the following: 
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common law 
tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers 
from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the 
creation of "quasi-property rights" in communicative symbols, the 
focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of 
producers as an incentive to product innovation.23 
The U. S. Supreme Court has been consistent in this analysis. In 
1918, the Court declared that: 
[t]here is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a 
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection 
2°Hogg v. Kirby, 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (1803). 
2'See. e.g., Rudolph Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?: The importance of the 
Properly Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 443 (1947). 
223 Myl & Cr. 338, 352 (1838). 
23Bonito Boats,lnc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,lnc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). 
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with which the mark is employed.24 
Therefore, the conceptual origins of Japanese trademark law and 
United States trademark law are fundamentally different. The United States 
concept of trademarks is based on the tort of deceit where the consumer had 
standing to sue, not the trademark owner. The plaintiffs rights in the mark 
commence upon and are justified by use of the mark in commerce. In 
contrast, the Japanese concept resembles a property right conferred by the 
government. Japanese law has many more incidents of property ownership 
than trademarks in the United States. Some of these examples are pursued 
below. 
IV. ACTUAL ISSUES 
A. Significance of prior registration 
1. Japan 
McDonald's experience of attempting to protect its famous 
trademark in Japan provides perhaps the best example of the differences 
between a system based on prior registration and a system based on prior 
use. In 1966, before McDonald's established a formal presence in Japan, the 
name "McDonald's" became known there as the name of a United States 
restaurant. In July 1969, as the name McDonald's become widely 
recognized in Japan, K. K. Marushin Foods first acquired the mark 
BAAGAA (a transliteration of the Japanese word for "burger") and then 
filed trademark registrations for a variety of marks that were identical to or 
closely similar to the marks used by McDonald's. In January 1971, 
McDonald's announced its intention to open restaurants in Japan and on July 
20, 1971 its first store opened in the Mitsukoshi department store in Ginza, 
Tokyo. In May 1972, after receiving other trademark registrations, K. K. 
Marushin Foods started selling hamburgers from vending machines using 
the marks such as MAKKU BAAGAA and MAKKU. 
McDonald's sued Marushin under the Trademark Act and under the 
Unfair Competition Prevention Act. McDonald's demanded an order 
restraining the defendants from using any of the Appellee's Trademarks and 
requested damages in the amount of 30,000,000 yen (about $300,000) or 
five percent of sales from February 23, 1974. McDonald's argued that its 
trademarks were "well-known" marks under the. Unfair Competition 
2'United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (19\8). 
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Prevention Act and therefore even though K. K. Marushin Foods registered 
similar marks first McDonald's should still prevail in preventing K. K. 
Marushin Foods from using their marks. 
The Tokyo District Court dismissed McDonald's cause of action and 
ordered McDonald's to pay costs. The Tokyo District Court held that the 
"well-known" mark exception applied only to marks that were truly well 
known in Japan, not in any other parts of the world.25 . 
The Tokyo High Court ultimately reversed26 and the Japanese 
Supreme Court upheld that reversaI.2' The High Court's analysis was as 
follows: 
One may conclude that most of Appellant's marks are 
conceptually included in Appellees' Marks (2) and (3) [and 
therefore the prior registration of these marks by Appellee should 
result in a dismissal for the Appellant as the lower court 
concluded]. However, although a trademark owner does have the 
right to exclude the use of another's mark that is withiri the scope 
of similarity of the registered mark, that trademark owner has no 
absolute right to use that registered mark. Using a [registered] 
mark [in light of a similar, well-known mark] is not an exercise 
of the trademark right as provided in Article 6 of the Unfair 
Competition Prevention Act. Therefore, Appellees' claim that its 
use of Appellees' Marks (2) and (3) because it had previously 
registered Appellees' Registered Marks (4) and (5)· is 
unsustainable. 
2. United States 
In the United States, the significance of the registration is different. 
Under common law, trademark rights extended geographically and 
substantively only as far as the first user had advanced the user's trade under 
the mark. Under this old system, a good faith second user could use the 
mark in a remote geographic market28 or in a vertically distinct market.29 
The Lanham Acfo codified this common law and at the same time 
made one national system of trademark protection. Section 33(b)(5) ofthe 
25 McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. v. Mac Sangyo K.K., 35 MINSHU 1169 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 21, 
1975). 
26McDonald's Co. (Japan), Ltd. v. K.K. Marushin Foods, 10 MUTAI ZAISAN HANREISHU 478 
(Tokyo High Ct., Oct. 25, 1978). 
27McDonaId's Co. (Japan), Ltd. v. KK Marushin Foods, 1020 HANREI JIHO 15 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 13. 
198 I). 
lBJianover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 
U.S. 90 (1918). 
29Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
3D 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. (1946). 
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Lanham Act was enacted to clarify a user's superior rights over subsequent 
registration. This is exactly opposite to Article 18 of the Japanese 
Trademark Law. Article 18 of the Japanese Trademark Law declares that 
"the trademark right shall subsist upon registration."JI 
However, although Section 33(b)(5) secures a prior user's rights in 
a mark even subsequent to a junior user's registration, registration by the 
junior user completely. freezes the senior user's rights to their scope at the 
time of the junior user's registration. 
Therefore, in Burger King of Florida v. Hoots,32 Burger King of 
Florida (the major multinational hamburger chain) opened a "Burger King" 
restaurant in Florida in 1953. In July 1961 it opened its first restaurant in 
Illinois. In October 1961 it obtained a federal registration for the mark 
BURGER KING for use on hamburger restaurants. In 1966 its mark 
became incontestable.33 . 
The defendant in the Burger King case, a small businessman in 
Matoon, Illinois, opened a hamburger restaurant in Illinois in 1957. In 
1959, he obtained a state registration for the mark BURGER KING. In 
Japan, the outcome of this case would not be difficult. Because the 
defendant's mark was not "well-known" or famous, the federal registration 
of BURGER KING by the multinational company would have extinguished 
all rights by Hoots, the defendant. 
However, the U.S. court applied section 33(b)(5) and allowed Hoots 
to remain in business and to continue using the BURGER KING trademark. 
The court then limited Hoots to the geographic and substantive scope of the 
mark's use as of the date of Burger King's registration. 
B. Treatment of Famous Marks 
1. Japan 
Famous trademarks in Japan have a reputation of being "under 
protected." This impression has largely been caused by horror stories told 
in the press and by apparent victims. These stories (some of them only 
partially accurate) have a foreign corporation as the primary victim and a 
competing Japanese company or even the Japanese government itself as part 
31 Shohyoho, supra note 2, art. 18. 
32Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968). 
33"Incontestability" refers to §§ 14, 15 and 33 of the Lanham Act whereby a registration that has 
survived for five consecutive years can only be challenged on certain, specified grounds. The 
specifically enumerated grounds are as follows: 1) fraud in obtaining the registration; 2) abandonment; 
3) used to misrepresent the source of the goods or services; 4) fair use; 5) prior use; 6) prior registration 
and use; 7) antitrust violations; 8) equitable defenses. See 15 U .S.C. § 1115 (1994). All other grounds 
become unavailable to a would-be challenger. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark 
Incontestability. 26 IND. L. REv. 519 (1993). 
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of a conspiracy to keep foreign competition out of Japan. Without intending 
to debate the accuracy of these reports, the following is a brief overview of 
the protections and presumptions that famous trademarks receive under the 
Japanese Trademark Law, the Japanese Unfair Competition Prevention Law, 
and the Japanese courts. 
a. Famous Marks Under the Trademark Law 
As stated above, because the Japanese system is a rigid first-to-file 
system, virtually all trademark rights are derived from first application and 
then registration of a trademark and not from use. The only meaningful 
exception to this rule is the treatment of so-called famous marks. 
The Trademark Law provides protections for famous marks. 
However, the statute never refers to "famous" marks. Rather, it only refers 
to "recognized" marks and "widely recognized" marks. 
Below are the author's translations of the provisions of the Japanese 
Trademark Law relating to the protection of famous marks: 
Article 4-1-10 
Trademarks which are widely recognized by consumers as marks indicating 
the goods or services of another--or trademarks that are similar thereto--and 
are used on goods or services similar to those of the other party [may not be 
registered]. 
Article 4-1-19 
Trademarks which are the same as or similar to trademarks that are widely 
recognized among consumers either in Japan or in foreign countries as 
identifying the goods or services related to another's business and are used 
for illicit purposes such as trading off the goodwill of another or causing 
damage to another may not be registered. 
Article 32 
1. Any person who has continuously used a trademark the same as or 
similar to a third party's trademark in Japan which the third party 
subsequently attempts to register on or in connection with the same or 
similar goods or services as identified in a third party's trademark 
application without an intent to commit unfair competition shall have the 
right to continue to use the trademark on or in connection with those goods 
or services if, at the time of the third party's trademark application (in the 
event a trademark application is considered to have been filed at the time of 
filing an Amendment Form pursuant to the provisions of Article 9C of this 
Law or Article 17B-1 of the Design Law applied in Article 17 A-I and 
Article 55A-2 (including its application in I6A-I), as a result of such prior 
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use consumers have come to widely recognize the mark as a trademark 
identifying the goods or services ofthat person's business and the prior user 
has continuously used that trademark on or in connection with those goods 
or services. This shall apply to the successors to the business of the prior 
user. 
2. The trademark registrant or its exclusive licensee may request that 
the party who has prior use rights pursuant to Article 32-1 show appropriate 
disclaimers in its use of the trademark to prevent confusion ofthe goods or 
services of each party. 
Article 33 The Right to Use a Trademark by Virtue of Use Prior to 
Invalidation by the Patent Office 
1. Any person that satisfies anyone of the following items and has 
used a registered trademark or a mark similar thereto on or in connection 
with the Identified Goods or Services or goods or services similar thereto in 
Japan without knowledge that its registered trademark falls under any of the 
items provided for in Article 46 prior to the registration of the request of a 
third party to invalidate the trademark pursuant to Article 46-1 has the right 
to continue to use the trademark on or in connection with these goods or 
services, if that mark has become widely recognized by consumers as an 
indication ofthat person's goods or services related to its business and if that 
mark has been continuously used on or in connection with those goods or 
services. This Article shall apply to the successors of the relevant business. 
1. The original trademark registrant where there were two or 
more identical or similar registered trademarks used on or in 
connection with identical or similar Identified Goods or Services 
and one of those marks has been determined to be invalid. 
2. The original trademark registrant where a trademark 
registration has been invalidated with regard to the original 
registrant and rewarded to the appropriate party for the identical or 
similar trademark for use on the same or similar Identified Goods 
or Services. 
3. . In the instances contemplated under Articles 33-1-1 and 33-
1-2, the exclusive licensee which has been subject to invalidation 
at the time of the registration at the request of a third party to 
invalidate the trademark pursuant to Article 46-1 or a nonexclusive 
licensee which has the effect as determined in Article 99-1 of the 
Patent Law applied in Article 31-4 herein regarding such an 
invalidated trademark right or the exclusive license. 
2. The trademark right holder or exclusive licensee has the right to 
receive appropriate consideration from any party that possesses the right to 
use the mark based on the provisions of the Article 33-1. 
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3. The provisions of Article 32-2 shall be applied to any case arising 
from Article 33-1. 
Article 60 
1. In the event a canceled or invalidated trademark is reinstated on 
retrial or in the event there is an order on retrial to register a trademark, the 
registration of which has been rejected on retrial, any person who 
subsequent to the issuance of the administrative appellate decision or the 
decision to cancel the trademark but prior to registration of the motion for 
retrial, has continuously used the registered trademark or a trademark 
similar thereto in good faith on or in connection with the Identified Goods 
or Services or goods or services similar thereto in Japan shall have the right 
to continue to use the trademark on or in connection with those goods or 
services if, as a result of such use, at the time of the registration of the 
motion for retrial; the trademark has become widely recognized among 
consumers as a symbol of the goods or services related to that party's 
business and that party continuously uses the trademark. This shall apply 
to the successors of the business of that party. 
2. The provisions of Article 32-2 shall apply to situations that arise 
under Article 60-1. 
b. Famous Marks Under the Unfair Competition Prevention Law 
The Unfair Competition Prevention Law protects famous marks 
regardless of their registration status. However, two significant restrictions 
exist regarding the application of this law. First, to be protected under this 
law, the mark must truly be "well recognized" and, second, use of such a 
well-recognized indicator of source must also amount to unfair competition. 
While neither the Trademark Law nor the Unfair Competition 
Prevention Law defines "well recognized," Article 2-1 defines "unfair 
competition" as "using a symbol which identifies a business (defined herein 
as a person's business name, trade name, trademark, mark, a container or 
package of goods related to a person's business or any other goods or 
business representations) which is the same as or similar to another's symbol 
identifying a business on goods which are widely recognized among 
purchasers ... " 
c. Selected Judicial Application of Famous Mark Doctrine 
1. DEFENSIVE MARKS 
Under the defensive mark registration system, "widely recognized" 
marks can be registered to cover other Identified Goods or Services than 
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those listed in the original registration. These additional goods or services 
need not be similar to the original goods or services and the registrant need 
not use or have any intent to use to mark on additional goods or services. 
The requirements are only (1) that the mark be "widely recognized by 
consumers" and (2) that confusion is likely if the mark is used on these 
additional goods or services by a third party. 
The Japanese Patent Office has published Guidelines for 
Examination of Trademarks. According to these Guidelines, whether a 
mark is widely recognized should be determined by referring to the 
following list: 
I.Duration and area of use; the range of goods on which the mark is used; 
2.Extent of advertisement used or other methods of publicizing the mark; 
3.The nature of the user's business and scale of use of the mark; and 
4.The amount of recognition the mark already enjoys within the Patent 
Office. 
Not surprisingly, very few marks have been registered as defensive 
marks because of the strict requirement of proving a mark is widely 
recognized. Furthermore, courts are also restrictive in granting defensive 
mark registrations. For example, the Tokyo High Court affirmed an 
Examiner's rejection of a defensive mark application to register the 
trademark MERCEDES-BENZ by the famous automobile company, who 
sought to prevent the marks' use or registration by another on string, rope, 
or netting. Because the mark on the string, rope or netting was not identical 
to the principle mark "Mercedes-Benz" as used on automobiles, the 
requirements of Article 64 were not satisfied.34 The court held that "if the 
plaintiff [Mercedes-Benz Auto] wanted to prevent the use of its mark in this 
fashion, it ought to elect to register the mark as an Associated Trademark. 
Attempting to interpret this as a Defensive Mark registration is absurd 
(sujichigai)."3S The court's statement is absurd, of course, because the 
statute also requires a likelihood of confusion (kondo no osore). 
The Guidelines also inadequately attempt to establish criteria for 
determining when confusion is likely and when the defensive mark 
registration is appropriate. The Guidelines merely ask if the goods 
generally are recognized as coming from the same company considering the 
nature of the manufacturers or channels of trade or in light of the raw 
materials used or customary usage. 
" Daimler Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Fink, 1326 HANREI JIHO 145 (Tokyo High Ct., July 27, 
1989). 
3S Id. at 147. 
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2. USE ALONE AS GROUNDS FOR PRlORlTY 
Although Japan's trademark system is a strict first-to-file system, 
very limited circumstances exist where prior use of a mark d~es create some 
trademark related rights. Some commentators consider the fact that a prior 
user of a mark can supersede a registrant's rights "a contradiction within the 
statute itself." 
If one entity's mark becomes widely recognized by consumers, that 
prior user may be able to use that fact to prevent another from registering 
the same or similar marks for use on the same or similar products. The 
Tokyo High Court has defined "trademarks widely recognized by 
consumers" to mean marks recognized nationwide by the primary 
purchasers of the same goods or those recognized regionally by at least half 
the primary purchasers of the same goods.36 
Furthermore, Article 32 provides that prior users of marks that have 
become widely recognized can continue to use the mark on or in connection 
with those same goods or services despite subsequent registration of the 
mark by another. However, if the registration does issue even in light of the 
prior use notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4-1-10, the registrant can 
demand that the prior user/non-registrant take appropriate steps to assure 
that confusion will not occur in the marketplace. 
In the well-known DCC Case,37 the court held that although a thirty 
percent recognition rate within a specific region was not sufficient to invoke 
the provisions of Article 32, attempts to enjoin the use of a mark by a prior 
user when the use was continuous for twenty-three years amounted to an 
abuse (ran yo) of the trademark right and was not allowed. This case is well-
known in part because of its amazing facts representing the harsh 
competition between companies in Japan and because·it also illustrates how 
compa,nies use trademarks to accomplish larger competitive goals. 
In the DCC Case, the plaintiff was the manufacturer and seller of 
a famous brand of coffee known as "U.C.C." The defendant sold a brand of 
coffee it called "DCC", but failed to register the mark. After the defendant 
apparently closely copied the plaintiffs sales techniques (conduct that was 
not actionable), the plaintiff registered the mark DCC for use on coffee and 
tea. The plaintiff then sued and moved for a permanent injunction to have 
the defendant cease using the mark DCC - a mark the defendant had been 
using regionally for twenty-three years. 
Under these facts, the court determined that the regional use of the 
mark did not rise to the level of granting the defendant statutory rights under 
Article 32 to continue use. However, the court also held that the plaintiffs 
)6Kamijima K.K. 15 MUTAIZAISAN HANREISHU 501 (Tokyo High Ct., June 16, 1983). 
)7DCC Coffee v. Daiwa Coffee K.K. 499 HANREI TIMES 21 (Hiroshima Dist. Ct., Sept 30, 1982). 
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conduct was an abuse of the trademark right and, therefore, the defendant . 
could continue using the mark. This case demonstrates that although the 
Japanese trademark system is generally believed to be a rather unrelenting 
system with catastrophic consequences to nonregistrants, there are instances 
when Japanese courts are willing to use other doctrine such as the abuse of 
rights concepts to arrive at a more reasonable outcome. 
3. WELL RECOGNIZED MARKS OF ANOTHER 
One reason to reject a trademark application is that the mark 
constitutes a "well recogni.zed" mark of another. However, this is a very 
difficult standard to overcome for a prior user/nonregistrant and all 
presumptions go against it. In the DCC Coffee Case above, the court held 
that though the mark had been used for twenty-three years and was 
recognized as a trademark by at least thirty percent of its targeted market, 
the trademark DCC as used on coffee and coffee related products were not 
"well recognized" for purposes of Article 4-1-10. Thus the standard for 
being "well recognized" is a very difficult standard and not easily met by 
regional sellers of products that are mass consumed by the general 
population. 
Although the general rule is that marks must be well known in 
Japan to satisfy the rule of Article 4-1-10, courts occasionally overcome that 
specific requirement if the mark becomes well known to professionals in the 
field where the relevant goods or services are offered even if those goods or 
services are never offered for sale in Japan.38 Therefore, although the 
magazine COMPUTERWORLD was never offered for sale in Japan, the 
fact that it had become famous in the minds of computer professionals in 
Japan made the mark "well known" for purposes of Article 4-1-10. 
The uncertainty about whether a'court would find a mark to be 
"well known" prompted the Japanese legislature to amend Article 4 to 
include Article 4-1-19 as quoted above. The purpose ofthis amendment 
was to standardize the rule allowing courts to look at use abroad rather than 
use in Japan as grounds for denying a trademark registration of a mark that 
is famous elsewhere. 
Because Japan is a first to register system and because registration 
confers property status on the mark in the name of the owner, granting 
significantly broader protection for famous marks than other marks is not 
conceptually inconsistent with its objectives. Therefore, Japanese 
commentators conclude that trademark laws include the right to protect even 
nc.w. Communications, Inc. V. K.K. Denchi Shinbunsha, 1430 HANREIJIHO 116 (Tokyo High 
Ct., Feb. 26, 1992) (sale of the magazine COMPUTERWORLD outside of Japan and its resultant fame 
inside Japan found sufficient even though the magazine itself was never offered for sale in Japan). 
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a mark's social function. Because the trademark right includes the publicity 
or advertising function, conduct that weakens the personality (kosei) or the 
distinctiveness or dilutes the product identity should be an infringement of 
the trademark right.39 
In the Yashiccf° case the defendant manufactured and sold 
cosmetics bearing the trademark Y ASHICA. The plaintiff was a major 
manufacturer of cameras and related equipment. Since 1959 the plaintiff 
has been the leader in exports of cameras and camera equipment. It 
employs approximately 2,500 people and is a large conglomerate (keiretsu 
gaisha). In the Yashica case, the plaintiff contended that the mark 
Y ASmCA was widely used on products other than just cameras and that it 
has been used specifically on film, radios, tape recorders and other optical 
equipment. 
The defendant argued that its prod~cts, cosmetics, were so 
dissimilar to cameras and related equipment that no consumer confusion 
(kondo no osore) could possibly occur and that therefore no infringement 
existed. The court disagreed with the defendant and held for the plaintiff, 
stating as follows: 
However, Defendant's use of a mark that was identical or similar 
to Plaintiffs mark Y ASHICA (also the trade name of the 
Plaintiffs corporations) which had become widely recognized as 
an expression of Plaintiff's business simultaneously with the 
Defendant'S registration of the mark [cannot be allowed by this 
court]. Moreover, the mark actually used by the Defendant 
resembles the Plaintiffs mark right down to the penmanship. The 
use of Defendant's mark in this manner was clearly intended to be 
a free ride on Plaintiffs mark. Objectively speaking, this 
amounts to the use of Plaintiffs expression of its image already 
registered and made popular by the Plaintiff. Since this amounts 
to the gratuitous use of the Plaintiffs ability to instill confidence 
and ability to attract customers, the Defendant's use of this mark 
in this manner must amount to an exception to the trademark right 
of the Defendant based on Article 6 of the Unfair Competition 
Prevention Law. Therefore, the law must protect [the Plaintiff] 
from this type of use and this use amounts to an abuse of the 
trademark right.41 
Significantly, the Yashica case arose as an exception to the 
3'MAKOTO AMINO, SHOVO [TRADEMARKS] 3-4 (1995) . 
• 0 K.K. Yashica v. Daiya Kogyo K.K., , 196 HANREI TIMES 62 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1966), 
translated in KENNETH L. PORT, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 801-03 
(1996). 
·'Id. 
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trademark right. Once registered, the owner of a mark is presumed to have 
the exclusive right to use the mark42 unless it conflicts with a well-known 
mark43 or causes dilution as in the Yashica case. Therefore, any restriction 
on the exclusive use right has to be conceptualized as an exception to that 
right. If the mark itself is property, this makes sense. When a mark is 
registered, the registrant can use the mark. The registrant can use it because 
the registrant owns the mark unless an exception to the rights granted under 
the registration exists. However, under U.S. law this scenario is unlikely. 
Under U.S. law, one can only register a mark after proof that there is no 
infringement. 
2. U.S. 
In the United States, a dilution cause of action is the only method 
for protecting famous marks beyond the scope of goods or services claimed 
and used by the trademark registrant or user. However, such broad 
protection does not make sense because the mark itself is not owned as 
property.44 Therefore, while some commentators claim that courts are more 
receptive to dilution cases, the Second Circuit has rejected one dilution 
claim, holding that LEXIS computer services were not famous enough to be 
diluted by Lexus automobiles.4s In LEXIS, the Second Circuit exercised 
tortured reasoning to avoid the plain language of the New York dilution 
statute. The Second Circuit first concluded that the marks were not 
confusingly similar because any educated orator would pronounce them 
differently. It then concluded that because no competition existed between 
LEXIS and Lexus and that because LEXIS was not famous, no dilution 
could be found. 
The Second Circuit's finding ignored the plain lariguage of the New 
York dilution statute which stated that: 
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the 
distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for 
injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered or 
not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding 
the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of 
confusion as to the source of the goods or services.46 
The New York statute does not require a mark to be "famous" to be 
'2 Shohyoho, supra note 2, art. 25. 
4) Fuseikyosoboshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Law], Law No. 14 of 1934, art. 6. 
"See Port, supra note 3, at 433. 
,sMead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). 
46N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1992) (emphasis added). 
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afforded protection. The requirement that marks be famous before they can 
be proteCted is a judicial creation that other courts have followed under 
factual settings similar to the LEXIS case. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
recently held that the mark FRUIT OF THE LOOM was not famous enough 
to be protected from alleged diluting use by the marks FRUIT CUPS for 
bustiers and FRUIT FLOPS for use on thongs.47 
According to Amino,48 and the Tokyo District Court in Yashica, 
dilution is precisely the harm that trademark law itself is intended to 
compensate. No dilution statute is necessary in Japan. The concept of what 
a trademark is and the objectives of the trademark system include the right 
to be free from diluting use by others because once registered, the registrant 
owns the mark just like a piece ofland. The use of that property is absolute 
and exclusive unless one of the few exceptions can be shown. Because one 
principal function of the trademark right is to proffer protection from 
dilution, outcomes like Yashica in Japan are natural. In contrast, the 
trademark itself is not property in the United States. Therefore, a specific 
federal statute is necessary to create a new property right, to redefine the 
trademark and to delineate the objectives of a trademark law before such 
a right will be recognized on a federal level. 
C. Trademark transfers 
1. Japan 
Article 24 of the Trademark Law states that trademark rights may 
be assigned on a severed basis (bunkatsu). The Trademark Law does not 
require that the goodwill of the business be assigned with the mark.49 The 
only meaningful restriction to assignment appeared in Article 24-2 which 
required rights in associated marks to be assigned with the principal mark 
to be valid. This makes sense because without the principal mark, the 
associated mark registration was meaningless. However, the 1996 
Amendments abolished the associated mark system and therefore marks' 
continue to be freely alienable and severable from goods and no assignment 
of goodwill is necessary to make the transfer valid. 
2. U.S. 
In the United States, transfers in gross are invalid. A trademark 
·'Fruit of the Loom, Inc., v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1993). 
"See generally AMINO, supra note 5. 
<Old. at 647-54 (1992). 
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may only be transferred with business goodwill.sO However, the transferee 
needs only to assign the portion of the goodwill attached to the mark. The 
transferee need not assign the entire business, personnel, machines, 
equipment, etc. In fact, some courts in the United States have held that the 
transferee may merely cease manufacturing or selling that good or service 
to make the transfer valid.sl 
The reasoning for this rule relates back to the fact that a mark itself 
is never subject to property ownership in the United States. Therefore, the 
mark can never be assigned alone because no property right would be 
assigned without the business the mark has come to represent. As stated 
above, the U. S. Supreme Court addressed this issue more than eighty years 
ago: 
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right 
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which 
the mark is employed. 52 
D. Geographic marks 
1. Japan 
In both the United States and Japan, marks that have only 
geographic significance cannot be registered.s3 However, the Japanese 
interpretation ofthis similar provision is remarkably different. 
For example, in the Georgia Coffee case,54 the Japanese Supreme 
Court upheld the Japan Patent Office's [JPO's] refusal t6 register the mark 
GEORGIA by Coca Cola. The Japanese Supreme Court upheld the refusal 
for different reasons than those of the Japanese Patent Office - reasons that 
will significantly influence the development of precedent in Japan. Instead, 
the Supreme Court's reasoning is very similar to that of the United States. 
Despite the virtually identical statute and the similar reasoning, the outcome 
in Georgia Coffee is completely inconsistent with United States notions of 
the geographic exclusion. 
In Georgia Coffee, the JPO initially refused registration simply 
because the mark is the name of a well-known place and the petitioner, Coca 
Cola, is located in Georgia. The JPO then determined that the mark was 
customarily used to describe these goods, i.e., that coffee originating in 
lOIS U.S.C. § 1060 (1994); Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut. Inc .• 418 F.2d 838 (9th 
Cir. 1969). 
IISee e.g., Hy-Cross Hatchery, Inc. v. Osborne, 303 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
llUnited Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
13 Shohyoho, supra note 2, art. 3(3); IS U.S.C. § IIS2(e) (1994). 
1<593 HANREI TIMES 71 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 23, 1986). 
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Georgia is customarily described as "Georgia coffee." Essentially, the JPO 
reasoned, the petitioner was attempting to register a word that described the 
source or origin of its goods. 
The Japanese Supreme Court rejected the JPO's reasoning. Rather, 
it adopted a test similar to that used in the United States. The Court 
required that the consumer should play a role in the analysis. If the 
consumer could not differentiate between the word as a trademark and the 
word as a geographic tenn, then registration should be denied. If, however, 
the consumer could differentiate then registration should be allowed. 
Finally, the Supreme Court affinned the refusal to register and held that a 
Japanese consumer could not differentiate between the word Georgia as a 
place name and Georgia as a trademark to indicate the source or origin of 
a line of beverages. . 
From the United States perspective, this case is almost impossible 
to imagine.ss 
2. U.S. 
In the United States, a mark is not registrable and not protectable at 
common law if it is of primarily geographic significance.s6 It does not 
matter if the mark includes some geographic reference, no matter how 
famous. When detennining whether a mark is primarily geographic, courts 
examine whether the public associates the goods with the referenced place. 
Therefore, the same geographic mark may be unregistrable and 
unprotectable on one good, yet valid on others.s7 
For example, in Nantucket, S8 the court found the mark 
NANTUCKET for men's shirts valid and registrable because there was no 
indication that the purchasing public expected the shirts to originate in 
Nantucket. The test, in the end, was whether the public associates the place 
with the goods on which the mark is used. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Illn faimess, I should point out that this decision is criticized by many Japanese commentators 
including Makoto Amino. See MAKOTO AMINO. SHOHYOHO ARE KORE 171 (1993). 
16 15 U.S.C. § \052(e) (1994). 
I'Compare National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 883 
(\955) (trademark DUTCH BOY not geographically deceptive or misdescriptive of paints), with 
National Lead Co. v. Michigan Bulb Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 115 (BNA) (Comm'r 1959) (trademark DUTCH 
BOY deceptively misdescriptive of flower bulbs not imported from Holland). 
18In re Nantucket, Inc. 677 F.2d 95 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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The protection offamous marks in Japan is as conceptually different 
from protection in the United States as the protection of all trademarks in 
Japan differs from trademark protection in the United States. Trademark 
jurisprudence in Japan exhibits more of the traditional signs of property 
ownership than trademark jurisprudence in the United States. In Japan, 
trademark protection begins with registration. Although the test for subject 
matter of trademarks is far broader in the United States than in Japan, 
registration in Japan offers far broader protection and is far more difficult 
to lose than in the United States. 
Trademark dilution is also a readily accepted notion in Japanese 
trademark jurisprudence where no federal dilution statute exists in the 
United States. Furthermore, trademark rights in Japan can be assigned in 
gross; in the United States such rights cannot be assigned without the 
appurtenant business. Geographic marks are more difficult to register in 
Japan presumably because the rights conferred are so much greater than 
those in the United States. 
Because trademarks themselves in Japan are subject to property 
ownership, the trademark owner in Japan obtains more protection. Due to 
this conceptual difference behind the two systems, Japanese courts seem 
more interested in protecting the investment of trademark owners than 
protecting the consumer from confusion. Therefore, trademark protection 
in Japan is actually stronger once obtained yet harder to secure than in 
United States. 
Although the Japanese system does have a reputation of being rather 
inexorable to foreign famous mark owners, foreign corporations might avail 
themselves of several strategies to protect their famous marks. For 
example, while the Associated Mark system is being abolished in April of 
1997, the addition of Article 4-1-19 is a significant change that allows 
Japanese courts to specifically look to foreign useto establish the fame of 
a mark. 
However, although the new Article 4-1-19 does allow an owner of 
a famous mark to oppose a trademark application in Japan based on the 
fame established for its mark abroad, Article 4-1-19 restricts such use to 
situations where the application in Japan is done "for illicit purposes." 
Therefore, innocent registration of a foreign mark made famous abroad is 
not specifically covered by the new statute and will continue to be possible. 
Although I entirely expect this to be rectified via judicial application as in 
the Computerworld case discussed above, the clear language of the statute 
allows for this possibility. 
As such, the most significant protection for famous marks in Japan 
remains the conceptual approach of Japanese judges as they apply the 
statutory provisions discussed herein. Because the United States' concept 
of trademark rights is premised on the Common Law notion of first use and. 
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protection was granted only to the extent one used the mark, the Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1996 was necessary to further protect famous trademarks. 
Because the mark itself is already considered property in Japan, such a 
broadening of the trademark right via a statute such as the Dilution Act 
would be entirely superfluous. 
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